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Abstract
We exhibit canonical middle-inverse Choice maps within categori-
cal (Free-Variable) Theory of Primitive Recursion as well as in Theory
of partial PR maps over Theory of Primitive Recursion with predicate
abstraction. Using these choice-maps, defined by µ-recursion, we ad-
dress the consistency problem for a minimal Quantified extension Q of
latter two theories: We prove, that Q’s ∃-defined µ-operator coincides
on PR predicates with that inherited from theory of partial PR maps.
We strengthen Theory Q by axiomatically forcing the lexicographical
order on its ωω to become a well-order: “finite descent”. Resulting the-
ory admits non-infinit PR-iterative descent schema (π) which constitutes
Cartesian PR Theory πR introduced in RCF2.
A suitable Cartesian subSystem of Q + wo(ωω) above, extension of
πR “inside” Theory Q+wo(ωω), is shown to admit code self-evaluation:
extension of formally partial code evaluation of πR. Appropriate diagonal
argument then shows inconsistency of this subSystem and (hence) of its
extensions Q+wo(ωω) and ZF.
1 Introduction
We begin with Proof of a local, middle-inverse formACCmi of—Countable—
Choice. This for fundamental Free-Variables (categorical) Theory PR,
as well as for Theory PR̂A = P̂RA of partial maps over Theory
0 this is part 4 of a cycle on Recursive Categorical Foundations, we rely on RCF1 and
quote section 2 of RCF2
0legend of logo: AC : Axiom of Choice, ∀∃! : Discrete map definition by “∀a ∃!b ϕ(a, b) ”,
ε : Iterative evaluation of PRA map codes, PRA the Theory of Primitive Recursion with
predicate abstraction
∗update to version 1 mainly of section 5 on self-evaluation
†last revised June 15, 2018
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PRA = PR + (abstr) of Primitive Recursion with predicate abstraction
〈χ : A → 2〉 7→ Object {A |χ}. Equational (!) Axiom ACCmi is pre-
served by theory strengthening, and by theory extension—the latter
with respect to PRA-defined maps.
[AC cannot hold for Theory PRA itself consistently ]
What we can prove is “even” middle inverse form ACCmi of AC,
for “classically” quantified Arithmetical Theory Q = PRA+ ∀∃!, having
(possibility of) “discrete” map-definition, via left-total, right-unique bi-
nary predicates ϕ = ϕ(a, b) : A×B → 2, a possibility for map-definition
typical for set theorie(s).
For Ordinal N[ω] ⊂ N∗ = ωω we recall schema (π) = (πN[ω]) of finite
descent for Complexity Controlled Iteration with complexity values in
N[ω], and definition of strengthening πR = PRA + (π) of PRA : within
πR the defined-arguments enumerations of its CCI’s are forced to become
epi, “onto”: These CCI’s on-terminate within Theory πR, in particular
so does formally partial—iterative—code evaluation of Theory πR, cf.
part RCF 2.
“Critical” Theory, namely Theory Qwo : PR̂A ⊐ PRA, enriched by
existential Quantification giving “total” predicates ∃nϕ(a, n) : A → 2
from “total”—PRA—predicates ϕ : A × N → 2, makes the (canonical)
middle-inverse partial maps, middle-inverse to defined-arguments enu-
merations of πR’s CCI’s, into “total” maps, maps within Qwo. Adding
these Qwo-maps as “total” maps to Theory πR, i. e. forcing by Qwo-
consistent axiom the enriched Theory—a priori only PR monoidal—to
become Cartesian, allows for resulting (Cartesian PR) Theory πR˙ code
self-evaluation ε˙(u, a) : πR˙×X→ X (within πR˙).
From this then results—by appropriate diagonal argument—inconsistency
of πR˙ as well as of its extensions Qwo, PA+wo(ωω) and ZF.
2 Middle-Inverse Choice Maps in TheoriesPR andPR̂A
Definition: For a given map (term) f = f(a) : A→ B of a (categorical)
theory T, a T-map f ′ : B → A is called a Choice map for f, in the
middle-inverse sense, if
f = f ◦ f ′ ◦ f : A
f
−→ B
f ′
−→ A
f
−→ B in T.
If the given T map f : A ։ B is a T-epi, then obviously f ′ : B ֌ A is
a T-section for f.
Definition: A (categorical) Theory T with terminal Object 1—or
at least a half-terminal Object 1 : each Object A admits a (non-necessary
unique) T-map ! : A → 1—is said to admit (middle-inverse) Choice, or
to satisfy Axiom ACmi if each T map f : A → B coming with a point
a0 : 1→ A, admits a middle inverse map f
′ : B → A in the sense above.
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Remarks:
• If T satisfies ACmi, then each “pointed” T-epi is a retraction:
T satisfies the (local) Axiom of Choice AC. And—dually—each
pointed T-mono then is a section.
• In set theories, requirement of pointed Domains seems to be redun-
dant, since non-empty sets have points, by extensionality axiom.
But are these points available for “construction” below, without
(set-theoretical) Axiom ACC of Countable Choice? In our case
yes: by the “set-theoretical” µ-operator, available e.g. in PA :
“(Classical) PA = PRA+ ∃ ”
Countable Choice Theorem for PR and PR̂A :
(i) Fundamental theory PR of Primitive Recursion—Objects: finite
(binary bracketed) powers of N, not yet formal extensions (abstrac-
tions) {A |χ : A→ 2} –, admits, within itself, middle-inverse Choice
maps f ′ : B → A for all of its maps f : A→ B.
In particular, all epis of this fundamental theory turn out to be
retractions: PR satisfies AC (here ACC).
[ All Objects A of PR are pointed, by—componentwise defined—
zero 0 : 1 → A. We just need any point. PR is not a pointed
category, since maps are not required to map “canonical” points
into canonical ones.]
(ii) Theory PR̂A, of partial PR maps over basic Theory PRA = PR+
(abstr) of Primitive Recursion with predicate abstraction, again ad-
mits axiom ACC of (Countable) Choice, in the form of middle-
inverse partial PR maps to arbitrary partial PR maps.
(iii) Middle-inverse form ACmi of AC is clearly inherited by strength-
enings of a theory, because of its purely equational character: To
each map is associated a map in the converse direction, with “char-
acteristic” middle-inverse equation—maintained.
(iv) Problem: Does Theory PRA “itself” admit AC?
Middle-inverse f− : B ⇀ A to a PRA map f : A → B is in
general not PRA. Use of AC in its epis-have-sections form cannot
be inherited by PRA from PR̂A since PRA epis are a priori not
PR̂A epis: a “direct” proof would need PRA p.b.’s to pull back epis
into epis, and this is excluded in general, by an argument discussed
in part RCF 2.
Proof of assertion (i) by recursive case distinction on the structure of
f : A→ B in PR, A,B fundamental, i. e. of form of a (binary bracketed)
finite power of object N :
• Case of map-constants: All of these come with retractions or with
sections, in particular since each of the fundamental (!) Objects A
comes with a (componentwise defined) zero 0A : 1→ A.
3
• Composition f = h◦g : A→ B → C : f ′ =def g
′◦h′ : C → B → A.
• Cylindrification f = (C × g) : C ×A→ C ×B :
f ′ =def (C × g
′) : C ×B → C ×A.
• Iteration f = g§ = g§(a, n) : A× N→ A :
(idA, 0◦!A) : A→ A× N is a section to f.
Proof of assertion (ii): middle-inverse Choice for Theory PR̂A :
For f = 〈(df , f̂) : Df → A × B〉 : A ⇀ B within PRA, we could
choose middle-inverse just (graph-) opposite to f, namely
f− = by def 〈(f̂ , df ) : Df → B ×A〉 : B ⇀ A.
But wanted proof of middle-innverse property
f ◦̂ g ◦̂ f = f ◦̂ f− ◦̂ f =̂ f : A ⇀ B ⇀ A⇀ B
is more conceptual—and simpler—if we use definition of partial maps
inside PRA via µ-recursion, cf. RCF 1:
We define our middle-inverse candidate g = g(b) : B ⇀ A in µR ∼=
PR̂A as follows, (essentially) via a (partial) µR-map
µg = µg(b) =def µ{aˆ ∈ Df | f̂(aˆ)
.
=B b} : B ⇀ Df ,
this with respect to canonical, Cantor ordering of Object Df = {D | ζ}
inherited from N via D fundamental.
Partial map g : B ⇀ A is then choosen as
g =def df ◦̂ µg : B ⇀ Df → A, with b ∈ B free :
g(b) =def df (µ{aˆ ∈ Df | f̂(aˆ)
.
=B b}) : B ⇀ A.
This g : B ⇀ A is a middle-inverse to f : A ⇀ B, since—preliminary
result:
f ◦̂ g ◦̂ f ◦̂ df = f ◦̂ g ◦̂ f ◦̂ df (aˆ)
=̂ f ◦̂ g ◦̂ f̂(aˆ)
= f ◦̂ df ◦̂ (µ{aˆ
′ ∈ Df | f̂(aˆ
′)
.
=B f̂(aˆ)})
= f̂ ◦ (min{aˆ′ ≤Df aˆ | f̂(aˆ
′)
.
=B f̂(aˆ)})
= f̂(aˆ) =̂ f ◦̂ df (aˆ) = f ◦̂ df : Df → A ⇀ B.
In order to get rid of the leading df : Df → A on both sides of the (re-
sulting) PR̂A equation above, we use the commuting PR̂A Basic Partial
Map diagram of Structure Theorem for PR̂A out of RCF1:
Df
bf

df

b=
A
d−
f
O
f / B
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In fact, with both “structural” PR̂A equations of the diagram, we
get from our PR̂A equation:
f ◦̂ g ◦̂ f =̂ f ◦̂ g ◦̂ f̂ ◦̂ d−f =̂ f ◦̂ g ◦̂ f ◦̂ df ◦̂ d
−
f
=̂ f ◦̂ df ◦̂ d
−
f by equation above
=̂ f̂ ◦̂ d−f =̂ f : A ⇀ B ⇀ A ⇀ B q.e.d.
3 Choice within Classically Quantified Arithmetics
Define TheoryQ = PRA+∀∃! as as Cartesian (!) PR extension of PRA
by Quantification—considered to give ∃b ϕ(a, b) : A → 2 and ∀b ϕ(a, b) :
A → 2 as total maps, this (intuitive) totality formally expressed by—
axiomatically maintained—Cartesianness, and by possibility—axio-
matically forced either—of map-definition via (formal) unique existence
of values to given arguments.
Formally, we define “minimal classical” (categorical) Theory Q by
the following additional schemata over PRA :
• “Quantified” law of excluded middle:
ϕ = ϕ(a, b) : A×B → 2 in Q
(no-mid)
Q ⊢ [∀b ϕ(a, b) ∨ ∃b ¬ϕ(a, b) ] = trueA(a) : A→ 2
• “Discrete” Map definition by unique existence:
ϕ = ϕ(a, b) : A×B → 2 functional from A to B, i. e.
Q ⊢ (∀ a ∈ A) (∃! b ∈ B)ϕ(a, b)
[Unique existence is formalised as usual by a
Free-Variables implication between maps.]
(∀∃!)
f = fϕ = fϕ(a) : A→ B, in Q characterised by
Q ⊢ [ fϕ(a)
.
=B b ] = ϕ(a, b) : A×B → 2
Forgoing schema—including its uniqueness clause—then gives, for all
Q-maps f, g : A→ B :
• argumentwise functionality:
Q ⊢ ∀a ∃!b f(a)
.
= b, in FV form, for a ∈ A :
Q ⊢ ∃!b [ f(a)
.
= b ] : A→ 2, a ∈ A free
• argumentwise definition of map-equality:
Q ⊢ f = g : A→ B iff
Q ⊢ [ f(a)
.
=B g(a) ] : A→ 2, a ∈ A free (Equality Definability)
iff Q ⊢ ∀a [ f(a)
.
=B g(a) ] : 1→ 2
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What we want to show for Theory Q is a (map-theoretical) local
version of the Axiom of Choice, AC, necessarily here just—pointed—
Countable Choice ACC.
µ-Inherit Lemma: Q (and hence Qwo) inherit PR̂A’s µ-operator:
for PRA-predicate ϕ = ϕ(a, n) : A× N→ 2,
Q ⊢ µPRAϕ = µPRA{n |ϕ(a, n)} : A ⇀ N
=̂ µQ{n |ϕ(a, n)} = by def
{
min{n′ |ϕ(a, n′)} if ∃nϕ(a, n)
undefined if ∀n¬ϕ(a, n)
: A ⇀ N
Proof: Asserted partial-map equality Q ⊢ µQϕ =̂ µPRAϕ : A ⇀ N
for PRA-predicates ϕ = ϕ(a, n) : A × N → 2 is due to the fact that
the two µ-recursive (partial) maps are compared—in both directions—by
suitable Q-total maps with respect to their graphs, as follows:
Consider—within Q̂—defining PRA-diagram for
µPRAϕ (a) : A ⇀ N, namely
{(a, n) ∈ A× N |ϕ(a, n)}
aℓ

min{n′≤n |ϕ(a,n′)}
''NN
NN
NN
NN
NN
NN
NN
NN
NN
NN
N
A
µPRAϕ / N
Partial µ-recursive map µQϕ = µQϕ (a) ⇀ N defines—“over” Q—an
equal partial map by
{a ∈ A | ∃n ϕ(a, n)}
⊆

min{n′ |ϕ(a,n′)}
&&LL
LL
LL
LL
LL
LL
LL
LL
LL
LL
A
µQϕ / N
Partial-map-equality µPRAϕ =̂ µQϕ in Q̂ (“over Q ”) established by
Q-maps
i : = ℓ ◦ ⊆ : {A× N |ϕ} → {a ∈ A | ∃n ϕ(a, n)} and
j : = (a, µQϕ (a)) : {a ∈ A | ∃n ϕ(a, n)} → {A× N |ϕ}.
Both i, j total Q-maps, since
µQϕ (a) = by def min{n
′ |ϕ(a, n′)} : {a ∈ A | ∃n ϕ(a, n)} → N
is Q-total q.e.d.
This Lemma gives
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Middle-Inverse Countable-Choice Theorem for Theory Q :
• SinceQ extends PRA andPR̂A, it inheritsmiddle-inverse-property
from PR̂A. In particular for a pointed PRA-map f = f(a) : A→ B
(point a0 : 1→ A given), Q inherits earlier partial µ
PRA map
f− = f−(b) = by def countA(µ
PRA{n | f(countA(n))
.
=B b})
=̂ countA(µ
Q{n | f(countA(n))
.
=B b}) : B ⇀ N→ A
as (partial) middle inverse.
[ countA(n) : N→ A retractive count, available via point a0 ]
• for a (pointed) PRA-map f : A→ B, the Q-map
f ′ = f ′(b) : B → A =def

f−(b) if f−(b) defined, i. e.
if ∃n f(countA(n))
.
=B b
a0 otherwise,
i. e. if ∀n f(countA(n)) 6=B b
is definitionally complemented into a (“non-constructive”) total
Q-map, f ′ : B → A, middle-inverse to given f : A → B in the
sense of schema ACCmi.
Comment: We will not rely on latter middle-inverse Q-choice map
f ′ : B → A—which involves “∀ ” and the Quantified law of excluded
middle.
∀-Elimination: For our argument below we may drop formal univer-
sal Quantor “∀ ”, Quantified law of excluded middle, and replace schema
(∀∃!) above by schema of map definition by unique value-existence
ϕ = ϕ(a, b) : A×B → 2
FV/∃! functional from A to B, i. e.
Q ⊢ (∃! b ∈ B)ϕ(a, b) : A→ 2, a ∈ A free
(FV/∃!)
fϕ = fϕ(a) : A→ B,
this map fϕ in Q (“again”) characterised by
Q ⊢ [ fϕ(a)
.
=B b ] = ϕ(a, b) : A×B → 2,
a ∈ A, b ∈ B free
as well as (canonical) map definition via “multivalued” predicate,
ϕ = ϕ(a, b) : A×B → 2 in PRA,
Q ⊢ (∃ b ∈ B)ϕ(a, b) : A→ 2, a ∈ A free
(FV/∃)
Q ⊢ fϕ = fϕ(a) =def µ
Q{b ∈ B |ϕ(a, b)} : A→ B (“total”)
= µPRA{b ∈ B |ϕ(a, b)} : A ⇀ B in PR̂A ≺ Q (subSystem)
This Q-map fϕ is characterised within Q by
Q ⊢ [ f(a)
.
=B b ] = ϕ(a, b) : A×B → 2,
a ∈ A, b ∈ B free, and value-minimality:
Q ⊢ [ϕ(a, b) ⇒ f(a) ≤B b ] : A×B → 2
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in the order (canonically) inherited by B (pointed) from that of N, via
retraction countB = countB(n) : N→ B.
So the critical properties of Q are those of its existential Quantifi-
cation. first: this quantification yields total predicates, in the formal
sense that it leads never out of Cartesianness, and second: it allows—
by sheer (established) formal existence of “values”— definition of maps
via (even “infinite”) argument/value tables.
4 Complexity Controlled Iteration Recalled
Complexity Controlled Iteration—CCIO—is Iteration of a predecessor
(endo) step, decreasing Complexity of argument—Complexity measured
in (a given) Ordinal O—as long as complexity zero is not “yet” reached.
Result then is the argument reached, with complexity zero. We choose
here (axis case) O : = N[ω] ⊂ ωω, the set of polynomial coefficient strings
(no trailing zeros).
It is highly plausible, and a Theorem in PA—at least in PA +
well-order of ωω –, that such CCI’s terminate, on each initial argument
given. So our first step in direction of Terminating Recursiveness—
strengthening PRA—can (and will) be formalisation first of the con-
cept CCI of Complexity Controlled Iteration (“over” O : = N[ω]) and—
second—introduction of axiom schema for conceiving weakest Theory πR
(strengthening PRA and) admitting termination of all these CCI’s.
We attempt to formalise wanted Theory within the partial-map frame-
work of theory PR̂A ⊐ PRA, which is a definitional, conservative ex-
tension of Theory PRA. It contains (Cartesian) PRA embedded as a
monoidal PR subCategory.
Definition: For “Ordinal” N[ω], schema (CCI) below (quote from
part RCF 2) is to define a Complexity Controlled Iteration—CCI—with
complexity values in N[ω], as a (formally) partial map wh[c > 0 | p] : A ⇀
A, definition based on suitable data c (complexity) and p (predecessor
step) as follows, within any theory S strengthening PRA :
c : A→ O in S, complexity,
p : A→ A S-endo, predecessor step,
S ⊢ c(a) > 0O =⇒ p c(a) < c(a) : A→ 2 (Desc)
strict descent above complexity zero,
S ⊢ c(a)
.
= 0O =⇒ p(a)
.
=A a : A→ 2 (Stat)
stationarity at complexity zero
(CCI)
wh[ c > 0 | p ] : A ⇀ A in Ŝ (partial) map:
wh[ c > 0 | p ] : A ⇀ A realises the CCI (as a while loop). As a partial
map it is given defined arguments enumeration
dwh[ c>0 | p ] (a, n) = by def a :
Dwh[ c>0 | p ] = {(a, n) ∈ A× N | c p
n(a)
.
= 0O}
⊆
−→ A× N
ℓ
−→ A,
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and (calculation) rule
ŵh[ c > 0 | p ] = ŵh[ c > 0 | p ] (a, n) =def p
n(a) : Dwh[ c>0 | p ] → A.
Comment: Essential “ingredient” for above iteration wh[ c > 0 | p ] is its
(formally) partial termination-index
µ[ c > 0 | p ] = µ[ c > 0 | p ](a) : A ⇀ N given as
µ[ c > 0 | p ](a) =def µ{n | c p
n(a)
.
= 0} : A ⇀ N,
and as such characterised—as partial map: within Ŝ—by
Ŝ ⊢ c p§(a, µ[ c > 0 | p ] (a))
.
= 0, and
µ[ c > 0 | p ] (a) : A ⇀ N (argumentwise) minimal in this regard.
Partial map
(idA, µ[ c > 0 | p ]) = (A× µ[ c > 0 | p ]) ◦̂ ∆ : A→ A
2 ⇀ A× N
is just the—pointwise minimised (“canonical”)—opposite partial map
d− = d−wh[ c>0 | p ] : A ⇀ Dwh[ c>0 | p ],
opposite to d = dwh[ c | p ]. As opposite, this d
− has partial section property
d ◦̂ d− ⊆̂ idA within Ŝ, maximally.
5 Cartesian Code Self-Evaluation “inside” Qwo
We question here—on consistency—Theory Qwo =def Q+wo(ω
ω)
= by def PRA + ∀∃! + wo(ω
ω) of classically Quantified Arithmetic with
well-ordered ωω, subsystem of set theory ZF.
We attempt to exhibit a Cartesian subsystem πR˙ of Qwo which
admits “total” (i. e. Cartesian) self-evaluation ε˙ = ε˙(u, a) : πR˙×X→ X.
As a consequence, Qwo will turn out to be inconsistent.
We first form the monoidal closure πR+ (d−wh[ c>0 | p ]), within πR̂, of
πR under all (formally partial) µ-recursive maps opposite, (canonically)
middle-inverse, to the (PR) defined-arguments enumerations
dwh[ c>0 | p ] : Dwh[ c>0 | p ] = {(a, n) | c p
n .= 0 ∈ N[ω]}
a
−→ A
of all CCI’s given by (PR) complexity c and N[ω]-descending (PR) step
p : A→ A.
Interpreted in frame Qwo, these d−wh[ c>0 | p ] become total, since
Qwo ⊢ ∃n [ c pn(a)
.
= 0 ] : A→ 2, (a ∈ A free), hence
Qwo ⊢ d−wh[ c>0 | p ](a) = by def (a, µ{n | c p
n(a)
.
= 0 })
= by def (a, µ
PRA{n | c pn(a)
.
= 0 })
= (a, µQ
wo
{n | c pn(a)
.
= 0 }) : (µ-inherit)
A ⇀ Dwh[ c>0 | p ] total :
A→ Dwh[ c>0 | p ] ⊂ A× N
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and they are, again within Qwo, sections to their
dwh[ c>0 | p ] : Dwh[ c>0 | p ] → A,
(not only partial sections, cf. the above).
Categorically, this totality means that theGodement equations hold,
“even” when these additional PR̂A-maps d
− are involved.
So the following Theory πR˙, strengthening of monoidal theory
πR+ (d−wh[ c>0 | p ]) ⊏ πR̂ by the following two axioms (“schemata”) is
—as a subsystem of Qwo—consistent relative to Qwo :
f : C ⇀ A, g : C ⇀ B in πR+ (d−wh[ c>0 | p ])(Gode)
For “induced” (f, g) = by def (f × g) ◦̂ ∆C :
C → A×A ⇀ B ×B :
πR˙ ⊢ ℓ ◦ (f, g) = f : C → A×B
ℓ
−→ A and
πR˙ ⊢ r ◦ (f, g) = g : C → A×B
r
−→ B
[We could add as an axiom section property dwh ◦ d
−
wh[ c>0 | p ] = idA,
given wihin Qwo as well, but forcing Cartesianness—standing for totality
of all of πR˙ maps—will be sufficient for our argument ]
Since evaluation ε = ε(u, a) : PRA × X ⇀ X is defined as a CCI
within PR̂A,
d−ε = d
−
ε (u, a) = by def ((u, a), µ{n | cPR e
n(u, a)
.
= 0}) :
PRA ×X→ Dε ⊂ (PRA ×X)× N
is in fact a πR˙-map (considered total as such).
Is it possible to extend this PRA-evaluation ε(u, a) : PRA×X⇀ X—
defined as a PR̂A-map—into a code self-evaluation
ε˙ = ε˙(u, a) : πR˙×X→ X ?
For this end, let us treat the additional maps
d− = d−wh[ c>0 | p ] : A→ D = Dwh[ c>0 | p ] ⊂ A×N
as “basic” with respect to the evaluating CCI to be constructed:
c˙ (u, a) = cε˙ (u, a) : πR˙×X
u
−→ πR˙→ N[ω]
is PR defined from cPR : PRA ×X→ PRA → N[ω]
by adding the clause
wh = wh[ c > 0 | p ] CCI =⇒ c˙ ( pd−whq )
.
= 1.
Extended evaluation step
e˙ = e˙ (u, a) : πR˙×X→ πR˙×X
then is PR defined from e : PRA × PRA → PRA × PRA
by addition of (Objectivity) clause
wh = wh[ c > 0 | p ] CCI =⇒ e˙ ( pd−whq , a) =def ( pidq , d
−
wh (a))
[ ∈ πR˙× (A× N) ⊂ πR˙×X ]
10
(Self-) evaluation ε˙ = ε˙ (u, a) : πR˙ × X → X then is defined—within
Cartesian theory πR˙ itself—-by CCI (!)
ε˙ = ε˙ (u, a) =def r ◦wh[ c˙ | e˙ ] (u, a) : πR˙×X→ πR˙×X
r
−→ X
with PR̂A middle-inverse
d−ε˙ (u, a) = d
−
wh[ c˙>0 | e˙ ] (u, a) : πR˙×X→ Dε˙ = {((u, a), n) | c˙ e˙
n(u, a)
.
= 0}
a PR̂A (partial) map, more: a πR˙ map. By Structure Theorem for
PRA, we have for any (partial) PR̂A-map f = 〈(df , f̂) : Df → A×B〉 :
A ⇀ B :
PR̂A ⊢ f =̂ f̂ ◦̂ d
−
f : A ⇀ Df → B.
So for CCI’s:
π ̂˙R ⊢ wh[ c > 0 | p ] = ŵh ◦̂ d−wh : A ⇀ Dwh → A
is represented as a πR˙-map w˙h :
π ̂˙R ⊢ wh[ c > 0 | p ] =̂ w˙h =def ŵh ◦ d−wh : A→ Dwh → A.
As a special case then
πR˙ ⊢ ε˙ = ε˙ (u, a) = ̂˙ε ◦ d−ε˙ (u, a) : πR˙×X→ Dε b˙ε−→ X
is a (is represented as) map in πR˙ itself. It constitutes a (code) self-
evaluation for Theory πR˙ since—only further property needed—it is Ob-
jective as an evaluation, will say
f = f(a) : A→ B a πR˙-map
(Obε˙)
πR˙ ⊢ ε˙( pfq , a) = f(a) : A→ B
Proof: Objectivity PRA ⊢ ε ( pfq , a) = f(a) : A → B of “fun-
damental” evaluation ε : PRA × X ⇀ X has been shown in RCF2, by
external PR on depth [f ] which relies on Peano Induction (on the iter-
tion counter n) in case ( pfq , a) ∈ PRA × X of form of an iterated:
( pfq , a) = ( pg§q , 〈b;n〉).
[ Free-Variables Peano Induction is available inPRA and strengthenings ]
Same PR argument works in present case of self-evaluation
ε˙ (u, a) = r ◦ wh[c˙ > 0 | e˙ ] : πR˙×X→ πR˙×X
r
−→ X.
The reason is that the evaluation clause for the additional maps is given
as an Objectivity instance:
e˙ ( pd−wh[ c>0 | p ]q , a) = by def ( pidq , d
−
wh (a)),
πR˙ ⊢ ε˙ ( pd−wh[ c>0 | p ]q , a) = d
−
wh (a) :
X ⊃ A→ Dwh ⊂ A× N ⊂ X
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So Objectivity is preserved by extension of evaluation ε to ε˙ : πR˙×X→ X
q.e.d.
But (Objective) code self-evaluation of any Cartesian PR Theory T
renders T inconsistent, as we will show in detail—final section—by the
“appropriate” diagonal argument.
Since self-evaluating theory Qwo is an extension of inconsistent πR˙,
Qwo itself turns out to be inconsistent. So in particular Peano Arithmetic
PA + wo(ωω) with the lexicographical order on ωω = N∗ ⊃ N[ω] a well-
order, as well as set theory ZF are shown to be inconsistent.
6 Liar via Code Self-Evaluation
Any Code Self-Evaluation family
ε = εA,B (u, a) : ⌈A,B⌉T ×A→ B
of a Cartesian PR Theory T within Theory T itself, which is Objective
as (self-) evaluation—see above—establishes a contradiction within T,
by the (“usual”) diagonal argument below: formalisation of “Antinomie
Richard”.
Remains to develop that diagonal argument “against” (consistent)
code self-evaluation for Theory T in general—skip, if you are used to
such diagonal argument –, same argument as in RCF3: Map-Code Inter-
pretation via Closure.
In presence of such (Objective) self-evaluation family ε define (anti)
diagonal d : N→ 2 within general Cartesian Arithmetical theory T :
d =def ¬ ◦ εN,2 ◦ (#, idN) : N −→ ⌈N, 2⌉T × N −→ 2
¬
−→ 2,
with # = #(n) : N
∼=
−→ ⌈N, 2⌉T the —isomorphic—PR count of all
(internal) predicate codes, of Theory T.
As expected in such diagonal argument, we substitute – within Theory
T—the counting index
q =def #
−1( pdq ) = #−1 ◦ pdq : 1→ ⌈N, 2⌉T
∼=
−→ N
of d’s code, into T-map d : N→ 2 itself, and get a “liar” map liar : 1→ 2,
namely
T ⊢ liar =def d ◦ q : 1→ N→ 2
= by def d ◦ #
−1 ◦ pdq
= by def ¬ ◦ εN,2 ◦ (# , idN) ◦ #
−1 ◦ pdq
= ¬ ◦ εN,2 ◦ ( pdq , #
−1 ◦ pdq ) (T Cartesian)
= by def ¬ ◦ εN,2 ( pdq , q)
= ¬ ◦ d(q) (Objectivity of ε)
¬ ◦ d ◦ q = by def ¬ liar : 1→ 2→ 2,
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a contradiction, whence
Conclusion (again): Code-self-evaluating Theory πR˙ is inconsis-
tent and so are all of its extensions, in particular “minimal” Quanti-
fied Arithhmetical Theory Qwo = Q + wo(ωω) with ∀ ∃! definition of
maps out of (binary, PR) predicates as well as its extensions such as
PA+wo(ωω), and extension ZF of the latter theory.
[Without well-order of “one of the first” countable “Ordinals”, namely
of ωω, (countable) well-order which is expressible within the language of
first-order set-theory 1ZF and already within that of PA, the theory of
(countable) Ordinals would be rather poor ]
7 Discussion
• Our inconsistency argument applies to Peano-Arithmetic, if this
theory is presented as predicate calculus (“full quantification”) for de-
scription of Algebra & Order on N, plus induction schema P5, i. e. if
PA is conceived as PR∀∃! : PR infinity plus “full” (classical) predicate
calculus, with “set theoretical” possibility of map-definition, see above.
But following Lawvere—and Goodstein—Algebra & Order can
be expressed by equations, in particular by use of truncated subtraction
[m .− n ] : N×N→ N, which yields order and equality predicates on N×N,
as well as (constructive) “existence” of b such that a + b = c, namely
b : = c .− a for “given” a, c ∈ N satisfying a ≤ c, see the Wikipedia-
article on Peano Arithmetic, and the fact that Peano induction P5 can
be expressed equationally, within (categorical) Free-Variables Calculus.
[ In PRA, induction axiom P5 is a consequence of uniqueness of maps
defined by the full schema of Primitive Recursion.]
But in Free-Variables setting—my guess—the PR schema, in form of
(special one-fold successor case of) iteration schema of Eilenberg &
Elgot, plus Freyd’s uniqueness schema for the initialised iterated, are
needed for (unique) definition of the more complex PR maps such as
exponentiation, faculty etc. which are classically obtained from addition,
multiplication, and order by use of (formal) existence.
• On the “constructive” side, Free-Variables categorical Primitive Re-
cursion Theory PRA above, strengthens into theorie(s) πOR (O an Ordi-
nal extending N[ω]) of on-terminating (not: “retractively” terminating)
Complexity-Controlled Iterations with complexity measured in O : These
theories “just” exclude infinite descending chains in “their” Ordinal O,
and seem therefore to be almost as consistent as basic Theory PRA (con-
servative extension of fundamental Theory PR.) Theories πOR are—“on
the other hand”—strong enough to derive their own (Free-Variable) Con-
sistency formulae, see part RCF2 mentioned above.
•Question: Does our inconsistency argument equally apply to Arith-
metical first order Elementary Theory of Topoi 1ETTN (Topoi with
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NNO) in place of Theory Q ? As far as I can see, our argument could
possibly be adapted to this case. Theory 1ETTN has two truth-Objects,
one arithmetical, 2 = by def {N | < 2} = 1⊕ 1, inherited from its sub-
System PRA, as well as its genuine, intuitionistic subobject classifier
1
false //
true
// Ω for its “specific” logic, in particular “receiving” (intuitionistic)
Quantifier ∃.
1
0

false
((QQ
QQ
QQ
QQ
QQ
QQ
QQ
QQ
QQ
QQ
QQ
QQ
QQ
2 is embedded into Ω via 2 = 1⊕ 1
(false | true) // Ω
1
s 0
OO
true
66nnnnnnnnnnnnnnnnnnnnnnnnnnn
1ETTN admits schema
ϕ = ϕ(a, n) : A× N→ 2
arithmetical predicate, in PRA
∃rϕ = ∃nϕ(a, n) : A→ Ω a (“total”) 1ETTN-map
—“ ∃ fits (already) in Cartesian frame”—
+ universal properties characterising map ∃rϕ : A→ Ω
within 1ETT.
My guess is that 1ETTN further admits schema of ∃-dominated
µ-recursion
ϕ(a, n) : A× N : A× N→ 2 in PRA
1ETTN ⊢ ∃rϕ = trueA : A→ Ω(µ˙)
Formally partial PRA-map µrϕ = µ{n |ϕ(a, n)} : A ⇀ N
“total”, i. e. represented by a 1ETTN map µ˙rϕ : A→ N
[ and 1ETTN ⊢ ϕ(a, µ˙rϕ (a)) = trueA(a) : A→ 2,
µ˙rϕ : A→ 2 (argumentwise) minimal in this regard ]
“Latter instance of (overall) defined µ˙nϕ(a, n) : A→ 2, fits into (given)
Cartesian frame of 1ETTN.”
We saw above that we do not need formal universal Quantor “∀ ”, and
in particular not Booleanness of Quantification—we could drop schema
of Excluded Middle.
So, if 1ETTN should admit latter schema (µ˙), of ∃-dominated totality
of µrϕ : A→ N, then our inconsistency argument would apply to first
order arithmetical Theory 1ETT + wo(ωω) of Elementary Topoi, with
lexicographical Order on ωω a well-order.
If so, then the final question is: Do real-life Topoi, i. e. interesting
Topoi of sheaves, have an NNO?
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